| 摘要: |
| 目的 研究制造商委托第三方回收商回收废旧产品模式的闭环供应链决策问题。 方法 考虑第三方回收的产
品质量,并运用 Stackelberg 博弈模型对成员决策进行分析,其次运用二部定价契约对闭环供应链进行协调,并对比
供应链协调后与协调前的总利润以及质量水平的关系。 结果 研究显示:集中决策下闭环供应链的总利润大于分散
决策下闭环供应链的总利润,而二部定价契约可以有效协调闭环供应链,当再制造能够节省的最大成本等于制造
商愿意为回收产品支付的最大转移价格时,协调后的闭环供应链整体利润与集中决策情况的闭环供应链整体利润
相同。 同时,二部定价契约可以提高回收产品的质量水平,有效清除分散决策情况下造成的双重边际效应。 结论
对于现实企业管理中的启示为:如果企业选择第三方回收模式,该情况下若需考虑回收产品质量,如果外界环境复
杂多变,为了提高生产效率需考虑回收产品质量,企业由于实际成本等原因需选择第三方回收,各企业之间进行分
散决策,可以运用二部定价契约进行协调。 |
| 关键词: 闭环供应链 委托回收 Stackelberg 博弈 双重边际效应 二部定价契约 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号: |
| 基金项目: |
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| Research on Closed-loop Supply Chain Coordination Considering Recycled Product Quality |
|
XIE Pingping1,LI Fang2
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1. School of Business Administration Xinjiang University of Finance & Economics Urumchi 830012 China
2. Management School University of Shanghai for Science and Technology Shanghai 200090 China
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| Abstract: |
| Objective The decision-making problem of closed-loop supply chain in which manufacturers entrust a third
party to recycle waste products was studied. Methods The product quality of third-party recycling was considered and the
member decisions were analyzed using the Stackelberg game model. Next the closed-loop supply chain was coordinated
using a two-part pricing contract and the total profits and the quality levels after and before supply chain coordination
were compared. Results The study showed that the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain under centralized decisionmaking was greater than the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain under decentralized decision-making and the twopart pricing contract could effectively coordinate the closed-loop supply chain. When the maximum cost saving from
remanufacturing was equal to the maximum transfer price the manufacturer was willing to pay for the recycled product the
overall profit of the coordinated closed-loop supply chain was the same as the overall profit of the closed-loop supply chain
in the centralized decision case. Meanwhile the two-part pricing contract could improve the quality level of recycled
products and effectively remove the double marginalization caused in the case of decentralized decision-making.
Conclusion The implications for real enterprise management are as follows. If enterprises choose the third-party recycling mode the quality of the recycled products should be considered. If the external environment is complex and changeable
in order to improve production efficiency and consider the quality of recycled products enterprises need to choose thirdparty recycling for various practical reasons such as cost. In this case enterprises make decentralized decisions and the
two-part pricing contract can be used to coordinate decentralized decisions. |
| Key words: closed-loop supply chain entrusted recycling Stackelberg game double marginalization two-part pricing
contract |
