| 摘要: |
| 基于双边市场理论构建数学模型对网约车出行服务定价决策进行研究,分析平台企业的服务
质量选择、平台补贴、网络效应以及进入市场的次序对双边用户规模、乘客支付价格、佣金比例及平台获
利的影响,研究结果表明:(1)在垄断情形下,平台实施补贴会导致乘客支付价格及平台收取的佣金上
升,进而促使乘客规模和司机规模扩大。 值得注意的是,平台是否采取补贴策略及补贴的分配方式均不
影响其获利水平;(2)双寡头竞争情形下,一方面,市场竞争使得平台间服务质量差异扩大,乘客支付价
格差距扩大,且司机端交叉效应强度较高的出行场景更易被高质量平台所关注;另一方面,无论平台进入
市场的先后顺序如何,动态博弈的结果均趋向于共赢;(3)在上述两种情形下,平台企业可选择提供高质
量或低质量的出行服务,但应避免选择中庸质量的服务。 研究可为网约车服务运营企业的定价决策及政
府部门的监管政策制定提供参考。 |
| 关键词: 网约车 双边市场 网络效应 服务质量 定价 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号: |
| 基金项目: |
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| Pricing of Online Ride-hailing Services |
|
WU Shiliang1, WANG Wen2, ZHONG Qin1
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| Abstract: |
| Based on the two-sided market theory, this paper constructs a mathematical model to study the
pricing decisions of ride-hailing services. It analyzes the impacts of platform enterprises’ service quality selection, platform subsidies, network effects, and market entry order on the scale of two-sided users, passenger
payment prices, commission rates, and platform profits. The research results show that: (1) In the monopoly
scenario, the implementation of subsidies by the platform will lead to an increase in passenger payment prices
and the commissions charged by the platform, which in turn promotes the expansion of passenger scale and driver scale. Notably, whether the platform adopts a subsidy strategy and the way subsidies are distributed have no
impact on its profit level; (2) In the duopoly competition scenario, on the one hand, market competition expands the differences in service quality among platforms and widens the gaps in passenger payment prices, and
travel scenarios with a high intensity of cross-effect on the driver side are more likely to be focused on by highquality platforms; on the other hand, regardless of the order in which platforms enter the market, the result of
the dynamic game tends to be a win-win situation; (3) Under the above two scenarios, platform enterprises can
choose to provide high-quality or low-quality ride-hailing services, but should avoid choosing services of moderate quality. This study provides a reference for the pricing decisions of ride-hailing service operation enterprises
and the formulation of regulatory policies by relevant government departments. |
| Key words: ride-hailing two-sided market network effect service quality pricing |
