Based on the two-sided market theory, this paper constructs a mathematical model to study the pricing decisions of ride-hailing services. It analyzes the impacts of platform enterprises’ service quality selection, platform subsidies, network effects, and market entry order on the scale of two-sided users, passenger payment prices, commission rates, and platform profits. The research results show that: (1) In the monopoly scenario, the implementation of subsidies by the platform will lead to an increase in passenger payment prices and the commissions charged by the platform, which in turn promotes the expansion of passenger scale and driver scale. Notably, whether the platform adopts a subsidy strategy and the way subsidies are distributed have no impact on its profit level; (2) In the duopoly competition scenario, on the one hand, market competition expands the differences in service quality among platforms and widens the gaps in passenger payment prices, and travel scenarios with a high intensity of cross-effect on the driver side are more likely to be focused on by highquality platforms; on the other hand, regardless of the order in which platforms enter the market, the result of the dynamic game tends to be a win-win situation; (3) Under the above two scenarios, platform enterprises can choose to provide high-quality or low-quality ride-hailing services, but should avoid choosing services of moderate quality. This study provides a reference for the pricing decisions of ride-hailing service operation enterprises and the formulation of regulatory policies by relevant government departments.