The issue of “who will farm the land” is always related to the national food strategy security, and the transfer of farmland is an effective exploration to solve this problem. However, there are a lot of personalized transactions in China’s agricultural land transfer market. Does this form of transaction affect farmers’ incentive to grow grains? This paper uses the zero rent of farmland to measure the transfer of personalized farmland and explore its impact on grain cultivation, as well as the impact of the transfer of personalized farmland on grain cultivation under different constraints. The study found that the transfer of personalized farmland significantly promoted the incentive of food cultivation among the transferring households, and the “tendency to plant grains” effect was obvious, and the effect of this “tendency to plant grains” was more influential among ordinary farmers. The main reasons for the “tendency to plant grains” effect of personalized farmland transfer are the cost effect, anchoring effect and mechanical substitution effect faced by the transferring households. In addition, there are also constraints on the “tendency to plant grains” effect of personalized farmland transfer. The profit motive of the transferring households and the fragmentation of farmland can significantly hinder the “tendency to plant grains” effect of personalized farmland transfer. The purpose of this study is to show that under the current situation where the transfer of agricultural land is characterized by personalized transactions, the effect of the “tendency to plant grains” can still be guaranteed. Nevertheless, with the gradual transformation of the agricultural land transfer market into a market-oriented one, how to ensure food security will be a major issue.