采用中国 A 股上市公司 2014—2018 年样本公司的相关数据,实证研究政府干预、金融发展和 法律保护三个维度的外部治理环境在高管过度自信与过度投资之间的调节作用。 研究结果表明,政府干 预程度在高管过度自信与过度投资之间呈正相关的调节关系,政府干预程度越高,高管过度自信导致过 度投资的可能性就愈高;金融发展水平和法律保护水平在高管过度自信与过度投资之间呈负相关的调节 关系,金融发展水平和法律保护水平越高,高管过度自信导致企业过度投资的可能性就越小。 最后从政 府干预、金融发展和法律保护三个维度的外部治理环境视角提出约束上市公司高管过度自信和抑制非理 性过度投资行为的政策建议。
Based on the data of sample companies of China’s A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018, this paper empirically studies the moderating effect of external governance environment from three dimensions of government intervention, financial development and legal protection on the relationship between executives’ overconfidence and over-investment. The results show that the degree of government intervention is positively correlated with the over-confidence of the executives and over-investment. The stronger the degree of government intervention, the higher the possibility of the over-confidence of executives leading to over-investment. Meanwhile, financial development and legal protection have a negative correlation with executive overconfidence and over-investment. The higher the level of financial development and legal protection is, the less possibility that executive overconfidence will lead to enterprise over-investment. Finally, from perspectives of the external governance environment of government intervention, financial development and legal protection, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to restrain the overconfidence of listed company executives and restrain irrational over-investment.