CEO过度自信如何影响公司投资效率---基于会计稳健性的中介效应研究*
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How CEO Overconfidence Affects Corporate Investment Efficiency:A Study Based on the Mediating Effect of Accounting Conservatism
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    摘要:

    投资决策是企业财务决策的核心,如何提高投资效率、降低投资扭曲行为受到各界广泛关注。本文以中国2003—2017年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,分析CEO过度自信、会计稳健性与企业投资效率之间的关系。研究发现会计稳健性在CEO过度自信与企业投资效率间起中介作用,CEO过度自信会抑制会计稳健性,进而降低了企业的投资效率;CEO过度自信的中介效应仅存在于投资过度企业以及高成长性企业中,对投资不足企业不显著。本文亦从企业和监管机构层面提出相应的政策建议。

    Abstract:

    Investment decisionmaking is the core of enterprise financial decisionmaking, therefore, how to improve corporate investment efficiency and reduce investment distortion has attracted wide attention. This article takes the Shanghai and Shenzhen Ashare listed companies from 2003 to 2017 as a research sample to analyze the relationship between CEO overconfidence, accounting conservatism, and corporate investment efficiency. The study finds that accounting conservatism plays an intermediary role in CEO overconfidence and investment efficiency. CEO overconfidence will inhibit accounting conservatism and further reduce the investment efficiency of the enterprise. The intermediary effect of CEO overconfidence only exists in overinvestment companies and high growth enterprises, it is not significant for enterprises with insufficient investment. This article also proposes corresponding policy suggestions from the level of enterprises and regulatory agencies.

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  • 在线发布日期: 2021-05-25