In 2012, China mandated that the listed companies integrate disclosure of R&D information in the report of the board of directors, which improved the comparability of accounting information. Based on the exogenous mandatory disclosure requirement, we make indepth analysis of the mechanism of the impact of R&D information disclosure on analyst behavior and have obtained, by matching the change of R&D information disclosure behavior around 2012, the treatment group and the control group. The results of PSM DID indicate that after 2012 the companies that have increased R&D information disclosure have attracted more analysts and brokerage concerns. Further research has found that this situation is more pronounced in companies with low information transparency and high agency costs. The important policy revelation is that mandatory disclosure can inhibit management’s selfinterested selection and analysts’ manipulation of private information to a certain extent. It is necessary to introduce a framework for R&D information disclosure and maintain a healthy information environment.