Choosing A shares of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange state-owned enterprises (SOE) during 2010 to 2014 as the sample data, this paper studies the relationship between SOE executives expected political promotion and inefficient investment, and further studies internal and external supervision mechanism, political promotion mechanism and the inefficient investment respectively by introducing internal control as internal supervision mechanism and anti-corruption governance as the external supervision mechanism of the national level into the research framework. The results show that in the state-owned enterprises, executives’ expected political promotion can effectively restrain executives’ inefficient investment behavior, that when the internal control quality is low, the inhibition of executives’ political promotion on inefficient investment behavior is more obvious, that by comparing the regression results before and after the anti-corruption storm, it is also found that after the anti-corruption storm, the inhibition of political promotion on inefficient investment behavior has been strengthened in state-owned enterprises. This conclusion has a certain policy suggestion for establishing various explicit and implicit incentive mechanism and for improving the internal and external supervision mechanism in SOEs.