The implementation of the agricultural insurance subsidies policy is effective in the local government moral hazard treatment, but the expenditure result of the fiscal subsidy in agricultural insurance is unfair. This paper tries to make a statistical analysis of the impact of agricultural insurance difference demands and fiscal subsidy in the three regions of the East, West and Central China on the basis of the theory of equity and preference of fiscal expenditure, so as to explore the best financial subsidy model. The results show that the marginal wealth effect of agricultural insurance in developed regions is lower than that in underdeveloped areas, that local government fiscal expenditure preference will promote agricultural insurance demands, and that the higher subsidy and guarantee in developed areas and the lower subsidy and guarantee in less developed areas made the income gap of the peasants between the developed areas and less developed areas further expand. Therefore, the multi-level agricultural insurance fiscal subsidy system should be formed by taking the central government fiscal subsidy as the main body, the provincial, municipal, county and township (town) level of fiscal subsidy as the participants.