家族持股、董事会独立性与自愿性信息披露
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Family Shareholding, Board Independence and Voluntary Information Disclosure
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    摘要:

    由于家族成员在家族企业中的特殊角色和地位,家族企业的信息透明度问题引起了学者们的关注。为了检验家族企业中家族成员持股、董事会的独立性对自愿性信息披露的影响,采用家族上市公司作为研究样本进行实证检验。研究发现家族持股比例与自愿性信息披露水平之间存在着显著的“倒U型”曲线关系,过高的家族成员持股不利于改善家族企业的自愿性信息披露状况;更加独立的董事长对于增强公司的信息透明度具有积极的作用,而董事会中独立董事的比例并没有表现出对家族上市公司自愿性信息披露的显著贡献。

    Abstract:

    Because of the special role and status of family members in the family enterprises, the information transparency of family enterprises attracted the attention of scholars. In order to test the influence of the shareholding of family members and board independence on voluntary information disclosure in the family enterprises, this paper makes empirical test by taking the listed family corporations as research samples. The study found that there is an obviously inverted “U” curve relation between the shareholding of family members and the level of voluntary information disclosure, that excessive shareholding of family members is not conducive to the improvement of voluntary information disclosure in family enterprises, however, the chairman who is more independent plays a positive role in enhancing corporate information transparency, but the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors does not show a significant and positive contribution to the level of voluntary information disclosure in the listed family companies.

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