| 摘要: |
| 员工持股计划重启是我国资本市场助力企业维持人力资源禀赋、建立长效激励机制的一项重要制度安排。以2014—2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本，探究员工持股计划实施对企业非效率投资的影响。研究发现：员工持股计划并未达到抑制企业非效率投资的理想效果，反而加剧了企业的过度投资，但对投资不足的正向影响并不显著；在市场化程度欠发达地区，员工持股计划与非效率投资的正向效应更为显著；进一步分析发现在大股东定向受让、股东赠予方式下，高管认购比例能够显著抑制企业的过度投资。研究结论证实了当前我国员工持股计划长期激励效应不足的现状，为监管层完善相关制度提供了理论支撑，同时对投资者决策具有一定的警示作用。 |
| 关键词: 员工持股计划 非效率投资 市场化进程 定向受让 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号: |
| 基金项目: |
|
| Do Employee Stock Ownership Plans Restrain Inefficient Investments of Enterprises? |
|
CHEN Yong-li, ZHANG Rui-ting
|
|
School of Accounting, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China
|
| Abstract: |
| The resumption of employee stock ownership plans (ESOP) is an important institutional arrangement for China’s capital market to help enterprises maintain their human resource endowment and establish a long-term incentive mechanism. This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as samples to explore the impact of the implementation of employee stock ownership plans on enterprises’ inefficient investments. The results show that ESOP does not achieve the ideal effect of inhibiting inefficient investment. On the contrary, ESOP exacerbates the over-investment of enterprises. ESOP has no significant effect on under-investment. The positive relationship between ESOP and inefficient investment is more significant in the regions with less developed marketization. Further analysis reveals that the subscription ratio of executives can significantly inhibit the over-investment of enterprises under the method of directional assignment by major shareholders and shareholder gifts. The conclusion of the study confirms that the long-term incentive effect of China’s employee stock ownership plan is insufficient, which provides theoretical support for the regulators to improve the relevant system and also serves as a warning for investors’ decision-making. |
| Key words: employee stock ownership plan inefficient investment process of marketization directional assignment |
