刘慧芬.研发信息披露与分析师关注[J].重庆工商大学社会科学版,2020,37(1):66-78
研发信息披露与分析师关注
R&D Information Disclosure and Analyst Attention
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  研发信息;分析师关注;信息可比性  信息披露
英文关键词:R&D information  analyst attention  information comparability  information disclosure
基金项目:
作者单位
刘慧芬 广东外语外贸大学 会计学院广州 510006 
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中文摘要:
      从2012年开始,我国强制要求上市公司在董事会报告中整合披露研发信息,这在一定程度上提高了会计信息的可比性。以外生性强制披露规定为切入点,深入分析研发信息披露对分析师行为的影响机理,通过匹配2012年前后研发信息披露行为的变化得到处理组与对照组,PSM DID的结果表明,2012年后新增研发信息披露的公司吸引了更多的分析师介入和券商关注;进一步研究发现,这一情形在信息透明度低、代理成本高的公司更为显著。重要的政策启示在于,强制性披露一定程度上可以抑制管理层自利性选择,以及分析师对私有信息的操纵,有必要出台对研发信息披露指引框架,维护健康的信息环境。
英文摘要:
      In 2012, China mandated that the listed companies integrate disclosure of R&D information in the report of the board of directors, which improved the comparability of accounting information. Based on the exogenous mandatory disclosure requirement, we make in depth analysis of the mechanism of the impact of R&D information disclosure on analyst behavior and have obtained, by matching the change of R&D information disclosure behavior around 2012, the treatment group and the control group. The results of PSM DID indicate that after 2012 the companies that have increased R&D information disclosure have attracted more analysts and brokerage concerns. Further research has found that this situation is more pronounced in companies with low information transparency and high agency costs. The important policy revelation is that mandatory disclosure can inhibit management’s self interested selection and analysts’ manipulation of private information to a certain extent. It is necessary to introduce a framework for R&D information disclosure and maintain a healthy information environment.
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