劳动力市场歧视成本究竟谁买单?*
DOI:
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

基金项目:


Who Will Pay the Cost of Discrimination in the Labor Market ?
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
    摘要:

    本文基于雇主的性别歧视模型对长、短期劳动力市场歧视成本收益进行分析,研究表明,短期劳动力市场上歧视性雇主为歧视成本的“消费者”,被歧视的女性劳动力为歧视成本的“买单者”;长期劳动力市场上歧视性雇主和被歧视的女性劳动力都是歧视成本的“买单者”,而离职的不再被歧视的女性劳动力却成为抵抗歧视的“受益者”;无论在短期还是长期劳动力市场上歧视性雇主获得的利润都低于非歧视性雇主。劳动力市场歧视程度主要取决于劳动力供给数量、非歧视性雇主数量以及歧视性雇主的偏见程度。

    Abstract:

    Based on the employer’s gender discrimination model, the costbenefit analysis of discrimination in the longterm and shortterm labor market shows that discriminatory employers become“consumers”of discriminatory costs, and the discriminated female workers are“payers”of discriminatory costs in the shortterm labor market; In the longterm labor market, discriminatory employers and the discriminated female workers are the“payers”of discriminatory costs, while the female workers that have left the discriminatory employers become the“beneficiaries”of antidiscrimination. Discriminatory employers earn less profits than nondiscriminatory employers in both shortterm and longterm labor markets. The degree of discrimination in the labor market mainly depends on the quantity of labor supply, the quantity of nondiscriminatory employers and the prejudice of discriminatory employers.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:
  • 最后修改日期:
  • 录用日期:
  • 在线发布日期: 2020-12-18