| 摘要: |
| 本文以2010—2014年度沪深两市A股国有企业为样本数据，研究国企高管政治晋升预期与非效率投资的关系，并将作为内部监督机制的内部控制以及国家层面的外部监督机制反腐治理纳入研究框架，进一步研究内外部监督机制下，政治晋升预期与非效率投资分别的作用机理。研究表明：在国有企业中，高管政治晋升预期能有效抑制高管非效率投资行为；在内控控制质量较低时，高管政治晋升预期对非效率投资行为的抑制作用更为显著；对比反腐风暴前后的回归结果，亦发现反腐风暴后，高管政治晋升预期对非效率投资行为的抑制作用得到加强。此结论对国企建立显性与隐性激励相结合的多方面激励机制以及完善企业内外监督机制具有一定政策建议。 |
| 关键词: 政治晋升预期 非效率投资 内部控制 反腐治理 |
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| SOE Executives Political Promotion Expectation and Inefficient Investment——Introduction of Internal and External Supervision Mechanism |
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ZHOU Ping-hua, MING Ying-ying
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| Abstract: |
| Choosing A shares of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange state-owned enterprises (SOE) during 2010 to 2014 as the sample data, this paper studies the relationship between SOE executives expected political promotion and inefficient investment, and further studies internal and external supervision mechanism, political promotion mechanism and the inefficient investment respectively by introducing internal control as internal supervision mechanism and anti-corruption governance as the external supervision mechanism of the national level into the research framework. The results show that in the state-owned enterprises, executives’ expected political promotion can effectively restrain executives’ inefficient investment behavior, that when the internal control quality is low, the inhibition of executives’ political promotion on inefficient investment behavior is more obvious, that by comparing the regression results before and after the anti-corruption storm, it is also found that after the anti-corruption storm, the inhibition of political promotion on inefficient investment behavior has been strengthened in state-owned enterprises. This conclusion has a certain policy suggestion for establishing various explicit and implicit incentive mechanism and for improving the internal and external supervision mechanism in SOEs. |
| Key words: political promotion expectation inefficient investment internal control anti-corruption governance |
