| 摘要: |
| 文章以不对称信息市场中的委托——代理理论为指导,基于对企业人力资本特点的揭示,分析了人力资本市场由于不对称信息所带来的不利选择问题和道德风险问题。并就如何规避隐藏行动的道德风险问题,给出了解决办法——即建立有效的激励机制。 |
| 关键词: 不对称信息 人力资本 激励机制 道德风险 |
| DOI： |
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| Design of human capital incentive mechanism of an enterprise under information asymmetry |
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ZHANG Min
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| Abstract: |
| Based on the guidance of trust—agent mechanism in the market of information asymmetry and on the characteristics of human capital of an enterprise, this paper analyzes selective issues and moral risk issues of human capital because of asymmetric information and gives solutions to the prob- lems about how to avoid moral risk of hidden behaviors, that is, effective incentive mechanism. |
| Key words: asymmetric information human capital incentive mechanism moral risk |
