针对生鲜农产品供应链上游环节中物流资源投入程度是否积极的问题,引入政府监管机制,建立政府监管部门、供应商与加工商之间的三方演化博弈模型,利用复制动态方程以及演化博弈理论知识,得到模型中行为主体策略选择的走向以及系统的演化稳定策略,并对参数进行赋值,用 MATLAB 软件进行仿真分析, 验证了结果的合理性。 研究表明:只有提高政府监管部门的形象效用、降低监管成本、增大处罚金额时,政府监管部门才愿意选择“监管”策略;而增大供应商与加工商积极投入物流资源的收益增加比率、缩减投入成本、减少“搭便车”行为获得的额外收益、加大消极投入的处罚时,供应商与加工商更倾向于“积极投入”策略。
Aiming at the question of whether the input of logistics resources in the upstream link of the fresh agricultural product supply chain is positive a government supervision mechanism is introduced and a three-party evolutionary game model between government supervision departments suppliers and processors is established. The trend of the behavior subject?? s strategy selection and the system?? s evolutionary stability strategy in the model are obtained by using the replication dynamic equation and the knowledge of evolutionary game theory and the parameters are assigned and simulated by MATLAB software to verify the rationality of the results. The results show that only when the image utility of the government supervision department is improved the supervision cost is reduced and the penalty amount is increased the government supervision department is willing to choose the supervision strategy however when increasing the ratio of profit increase of suppliers and processors actively investing in logistics resources reducing input costs reducing the additional benefits obtained from ??free-riding behavior and increasing penalties for passive investment suppliers and processors are more inclined to ??active"investment strategy.
HUANG Wen QIU Xiao-ling. Analysis of Three-party Evolutionary Game Based on Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain[J]. Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University(Natural Science Edition）,2022,39(6):40-47