Aiming at the question of whether the input of logistics resources in the upstream link of the fresh agricultural product supply chain is positive a government supervision mechanism is introduced and a three-party evolutionary game model between government supervision departments suppliers and processors is established. The trend of the behavior subject?? s strategy selection and the system?? s evolutionary stability strategy in the model are obtained by using the replication dynamic equation and the knowledge of evolutionary game theory and the parameters are assigned and simulated by MATLAB software to verify the rationality of the results. The results show that only when the image utility of the government supervision department is improved the supervision cost is reduced and the penalty amount is increased the government supervision department is willing to choose the supervision strategy however when increasing the ratio of profit increase of suppliers and processors actively investing in logistics resources reducing input costs reducing the additional benefits obtained from ??free-riding behavior and increasing penalties for passive investment suppliers and processors are more inclined to ??active"investment strategy.