戴道明, 刘磊.政府补贴和消费者绿色偏好供应链策略及协调[J].重庆工商大学学报(自然科学版),2022,39(3):81-88
DAI Dao-ming, LIU Lei.Strategies and Coordination in Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidy and Consumers’Green Preference[J].Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University(Natural Science Edition),2022,39(3):81-88
政府补贴和消费者绿色偏好供应链策略及协调
Strategies and Coordination in Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidy and Consumers’Green Preference
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  绿色供应链  政府补贴  渠道结构  协调契约
英文关键词:green supply chain  government subsidy  channel structure  coordination contract
基金项目:
作者单位
戴道明, 刘磊 安徽财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 安徽 蚌埠 233000 
摘要点击次数: 92
全文下载次数: 90
中文摘要:
      在考虑政府补贴和消费者绿色偏好情形下,为探究制造商开通在线渠道的动机,以及不同渠道 结构中供应链成员最优决策和社会福利的变化,构建制造商领导、零售商跟随的 Stackelberg 模型;比较不同 渠道结构下供应链成员的均衡策略,并设计价格折扣和成本分担契约实现供应链协调,最后通过算例对模型 进行验证;研究发现,政府补贴能够提高制造商开通在线渠道的动机;与单渠道相比,双渠道结构能够明显提 高制造商的利润及社会福利;零售商双渠道的利润是否高于单渠道的利润与消费者绿色偏好有关,当消费者 绿色偏好较高时,零售商双渠道的利润才高于单渠道的利润;价格折扣和成本分担契约可以实现整个供应链 系统协调,并且政府补贴和消费者绿色偏好越高时,供应链整体利润改进的幅度越大,此时制造商和零售商 更有合作的意向。
英文摘要:
      To explore the manufacturer’s motivation for opening online channels, as well as the changes in the optimal decision-making of supply chain members and social welfare in different channel structures, the Stackelberg model is built considering government subsidies and consumers’ green preferences, in which the manufacturer is a leader and the retailer is a follower. Firstly, the equilibrium strategies of supply chain members under different channel structures are compared; then, the price discount-cost sharing contracts are designed to achieve supply chain coordination; finally, the calculation examples are given to validate the model. The study finds that government subsidy can increase the manufacturer’s incentive to open online channel; compared with the single- channel structure, the manufacturer’s profit and the social welfare can be significantly improved in the dual-channel structure; whether the retailer’s profit in dual-channel is higher than that in single-channel is related to the consumers’ green preference. When the consumer’s green preferences are higher, the retailer’s profit in dual channels is higher than that in single channel. Price discount-cost sharing contract can achieve the coordination of the entire supply chain system, and the higher the government subsidy and consumer green preference, the greater the improvement in the overall profit of the supply chain, and the higher cooperative intentions of manufacturer and retailer.
查看全文  查看/发表评论  下载PDF阅读器
关闭
重庆工商大学学报自然科学版 版权所有
地址:中国 重庆市 南岸区学府大道19号,重庆工商大学学报编辑部 邮编:400067
电话:023-62769495 传真:
您是第3330473位访客
关注微信二维码