摘要: |
针对不完全信息下双寡头交易,提出了风险资产交易市场中内部交易模型.内部交易者能获得私有信息,因此内部交易者利用私有信息进行投资获取利润;但是,当内部交易者对市场的有利情况进行分析后,他们以某风险概率投入交易量,此时内部交易者交易策略相同,期望利润更高,交易强度更大,释放的私有信息不变;由于内部交易者可以选择性投入交易总量,当投入交易量对自己有利时,他们投入大量交易量,因此,他们交易强度更大,能获得更高利润;内部交易者私有信息释放量只与交易量相关,与他们是否交易无关,所以,内部交易者选择性投入交易量会更有利. |
关键词: 内部交易者 噪声交易者 做市商 风险概率 不完全信号 |
DOI: |
分类号: |
基金项目: |
|
Insider Trading about Incomplete Signal under Risk Probability |
XIAO Kai1, ZHOU Yong hui2, KUANG Shan1, SHU Kang1
|
Abstract: |
According to duopoly trading under incomplete information,the insider trading model in risk assets transaction market is proposed. The insider traders can obtain private information,therefore,the insider traders can obtain profit by using the private information to invest,however,after the insider traders analyze the advantageous situation of the market,they input trading volume by risk probability,then the trading strategy of the insider traders is the same,they expect higher profit and bigger transaction strength,but the released private information is unchanged. Because the insider traders can selectively input the total,they input large trading volume when the trading volume is favorable to them,thus,their transaction strength is bigger,they can obtain high profit. The released amount of private information of the insider traders is only related to trading volume and is nothing to do with whether they join the transaction. As a result,it is more favorable for the insider traders to selectively input trading volume. |
Key words: insider trader noise trader market maker risk probability incomplete signal |