扩大还是缩小:ESG表现对企业内部薪酬差距的影响
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Widening or Narrowing: Effect of ESG Performance on Internal Pay Gap in Enterprises
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    摘要:

    在企业改善ESG表现的过程中,高管发挥了关键作用并承担了较大风险,使得高管在企业内的地位和在薪酬谈判中的议价能力得以提升,并能够获得更多的风险报酬,进而导致高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距扩大。采用高管平均薪酬与普通员工平均薪酬之比来衡量企业的内部薪酬差距,以2009—2022年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究发现:企业ESG表现改善显著提高了高管的平均薪酬,但对普通员工的平均薪酬没有显著影响,从而扩大了企业内部薪酬差距;ESG表现改善能够通过增强高管议价能力和增加高管风险承担两条路径来扩大普通员工与高管之间的薪酬差距;ESG表现改善对企业内部薪酬差距的扩大作用在规模较大的企业、员工议价能力较弱的企业、高新技术行业企业、高污染行业企业中更为显著。因此,在大力推动ESG发展的过程中,应重视企业ESG表现改善的内部薪酬差距扩大效应,并通过完善薪酬分配机制、提高普通员工议价能力等方式有效抑制企业内部薪酬差距的扩大。

    Abstract:

    In recent years, as environmental pollution and climate change have become increasingly prominent, ESG (environmental, social, and governance) has rapidly developed globally, becoming a hot topic widely studied by scholars both domestically and internationally. Research has found that ESG performance in enterprises has a significant positive impact on corporate performance and long-term value. However, fewer studies have focused on the impact of ESG performance on income disparities among different groups within enterprises. Enterprises, as important participants, play a crucial role in narrowing the income gap among residents. Therefore, it is worth exploring whether the ESG advantages demonstrated in promoting sustainable economic development and actively fulfilling social responsibilities will widen or narrow corporate compensation disparities. This paper uses data from the WIND database and the CSMAR database, referencing the methodology of Mao Qilin and Wang Yueqing (2023), and employs the ESG rating of the Huazheng Index as the primary measure of corporate ESG performance. The rating indicators are quantified, assigned values ranging from 1 to 9, to explore the potential impact of improved ESG performance on internal income distribution and its transmission channels within enterprises. Empirical research finds that improved ESG performance widens the compensation gap within enterprises. After considering alternative key variables, endogeneity issues, and the influence of employee structure, the regression results remain robust. Mechanism analysis reveals that improved ESG performance widens the compensation gap by strengthening the bargaining power of executives and increasing their risk-taking levels. Further analysis indicates that the widening effect of ESG performance on compensation gaps is more pronounced in enterprises with low employee bargaining power, high environmental sensitivity, high-tech enterprises, and large firms. Compared with previous literature, this paper makes several extensions. Firstly, it reveals the relationship between ESG performance and corporate compensation gaps in the context of sustainable development, supplementing the literature on factors influencing corporate compensation gaps. Secondly, it explores the role of corporate ESG performance in the corporate compensation governance system from the perspective of internal pay gaps, enriching the literature on the economic consequences of ESG performance. Thirdly, it investigates the income distribution effect of ESG performance and further clarifies its mechanism, providing decision-making references for promoting the construction of a more equitable and sustainable compensation system within firms. This study reveals, to some extent, the relationship between ESG performance and corporate compensation gaps and their underlying logic. It helps promote efforts to optimize executive compensation appraisal systems while increasing the intensity of ESG construction and providing risk compensation for executives. It also provides insights for effectively coordinating management mechanisms for executive evaluation and incentives and enhancing the transparency of compensation distribution between executives and employees.

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陈鹏程,赵瑞洁,刘静一.扩大还是缩小:ESG表现对企业内部薪酬差距的影响[J].西部论坛,2024,34(5):111-124

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  • 在线发布日期: 2024-11-17