Excessive managerial perks, a prevalent phenomenon in Chinese listed companies, pose a substantial risk to shareholder wealth and overall corporate value. Consequently, the governance of managerial perks has emerged as a matter of paramount importance, both in theoretical discourse and practical application. The introduction of Golden Tax III marks a new stage in the digitization of China’s tax enforcement, the subsequent construction of Golden Tax IV will further propel the digitization of tax administration to a new level. Despite these advancements, there remains a notable gap in research, particularly regarding the perspective of the tax enforcement environment on the issue of managerial perks. This prompts a critical inquiry into whether the digital upgrade of tax enforcement can effectively mitigate the prevalence of managerial perks. Using a sample of A-share listed companies spanning the period from 2010 to 2021, strategically utilizing the gradual implementation of Golden Tax III as a “quasi-natural experiment” and applying the Difference-in-Difference (DID) method, the study investigates the impact of the digital tax enforcement on managerial perks and the mechanism of its role in it. The research found that the implementation of digital tax enforcement, as represented by the Golden Tax III, unveiled a significant reduction in the managerial perks of the target firms. The mechanism tests reveal that the primary mechanisms through which digital tax enforcement achieves this reduction involve the mitigation of information asymmetry and the inhibition of corporate tax avoidance activities. Further exploration into the nuanced aspects of the impact of digital tax enforcement on managerial perks indicates that the inhibitory effect is not uniform across all companies. Our findings suggest that the inhibitory effect of digital tax enforcement on managerial perks is more pronounced in companies characterized by higher levels of information asymmetry, greater opportunities for rent-seeking, and stronger intentions to control managerial perks by taking advantage of reduced information asymmetry and rent-seeking opportunities. Specifically, the effects are more pronounced in companies with non-Big4 auditing, CEO duality, non-state-owned, and higher equity concentration. Furthermore, we extend our focus beyond the immediate reduction in managerial perks and delve into the broader consequences for corporate performance. Notably, digital tax enforcement can also mitigate the negative impact of managerial perks on corporate performance and thus help to improve corporate performance. This study not only expands the research framework of managerial perk’s influence factors but also enriches the economic consequences research of digital tax enforcement. What’s more, it offers valuable insights for a more profound understanding of the policy effects associated with tax enforcement digitization upgrades. The research findings, to some extent, shed light on the intrinsic logic of how digital tax enforcement influences corporate behavior, and is helpful for the government to pay attention to the spillover effects of digital regulation based on understanding the direct effects of digital regulation, so as to further accelerate the ongoing process of tax enforcement digitization transformation. In addition, the study discerns a noteworthy observation regarding the differential impact of digital tax enforcement on managerial perks based on the adaptive capabilities of companies in the face of changing external regulatory environments. This implies that, in the digital era, companies should prioritize enhancing their adaptive capabilities to seize the pulse of the times and take the initiative when facing the opportunities presented by rapid technological and other environmental changes.