“Sunlight is the best preservative, and light is the most effective police”. Information disclosure is the soul of the capital market and is an important embodiment of the effectiveness of corporate governance. However, in the real environment, the information disclosure violations driven by the interests of listed companies not only affect investor confidence, causing capital allocation errors, but also destroy the financial supervision order and hinder the healthy and stable development of the capital market. In the context of the digital economy era, the in-depth integration of digital technology with the tax collection and administration system has become an important governance tool of the digital government, which may play an important role in regulating and governing listed companies, and has become an important direction to be actively explored by the financial market regulators and tax collection and administration departments. Taking listed companies’ information disclosure violations as a research perspective, this paper selects the third phase of the Golden Tax Project as a quasi-natural experiment scene to investigate the policy effects, action mechanisms, and differences in different scenarios of the digital upgrade of tax collection and administration. Benchmark regression found that the digital upgrade of tax collection and administration had a significant inhibitory effect on listed companies’ information disclosure violations, which has been verified by a series of robustness tests. The test of the mechanism of action shows that the digital upgrade of tax collection and administration mainly inhibits the violation of information disclosure of listed companies by optimizing corporate governance and improving the information environment. Expansion analysis shows that the governance effect of digital upgrading of tax collection and administration on disclosure of listed companies varies significantly depending on the intensity of regional tax administration, the degree of industry competition, and the quality of internal control. Compared with previous literature, this paper expands in the following two aspects: firstly, it explores the theoretical mechanism of the digital upgrade of tax collection and administration affecting corporate disclosure violations, and enriches the research on the economic consequences of the digital upgrade of tax collection and administration from the perspective of disclosure governance, unlike the existing studies focusing on the perspectives of daily operation, financing constraints, and social responsibility of enterprises; secondly, it provides a new perspective for the research on the information disclosure governance of listed companies. This paper uses the third phase of the Golden Tax Project as a policy impact and adopts the differential model to systematically test the impact of tax collection and administration under big data technology on the information disclosure behavior of listed companies. To a certain extent, the research in this paper reveals the internal logic of the digital upgrade of tax collection and administration to participate in the governance of listed companies, which helps to improve our understanding of the violations of information disclosure of listed companies, and helps government departments to serve the healthy development of the capital market in a more targeted manner under the initiative of “strengthening the construction of digital government and promoting the modernization of governance capacity”. It provides differentiated experience support for the information disclosure governance of listed companies under different scenarios, and better guides enterprises to strengthen their integrity construction and strictly comply with relevant accounting standards and information disclosure standards.