联合风投比单独风投更能降低IPO抑价率吗?——来自2009—2019年中国创业板上市公司的经验证据
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Can Joint Venture Capital Reduce IPO Underpricing more than Single Venture Capital?: Based on the Experience Analysis of Listed Companies on China Growth Enterprise Market from 2009 to 2019
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    摘要:

    IPO抑价现象在全球资本市场中普遍存在,但相比于发达国家较为成熟的资本市场,中国创业板市场的IPO抑价率明显偏高,不利于资本配置效率的提高和资本市场的健康发展。IPO抑价是一种在“委托—代理”关系下信息不对称导致的逆向选择行为,风险投资的介入不但可以通过风险投资机构的“信息优势”减小发行人与承销商之间的信息不对称程度,还可以通过“认证作用”减小发行人与投资者之间的信息不对称程度,因而可以降低公司IPO抑价率;联合风险投资是多个风险投资机构的集体行为,可以产生“协同效应”,强化风险投资带来的“信息优势”和“认证作用”,能够更有效地降低公司IPO抑价率;但如果联合风险投资中各投资机构持股份额的差异过大,会弱化“跟随者”的积极作用,甚至产生“搭便车”行为,进而可能会减弱联合风险投资介入对IPO抑价率的抑制效应。以2009—2019年中国创业板上市公司为样本的分析发现:风险投资介入能显著降低公司IPO抑价率,联合风险投资介入的公司比单独风险投资介入的公司IPO抑价率更低,联合风险投资中各投资机构持股比例差异的减小有利于公司IPO抑价率的降低;并且,联合风险投资介入的公司比单独风险投资介入的公司有更高的治理水平和资产回报率,因而能更有效地降低公司IPO抑价率。应加强资本市场监管力度,降低信息不对称程度,减少和避免承销商和风险投资机构的逆向选择行为;创业企业应尽可能选择联合风投形式进行IPO,并理性选择与自身发展相契合的风险投资机构,同时也要努力提升自身管理水平、信誉水平和市场资源配置能力,进而有效降低IPO抑价率,促进资本市场的高质量发展。

    Abstract:

    Although IPO underpricing is widespread in the global capital market, the IPO underpricing rate of China’s Growth Enterprise Market is relatively high compared with the mature capital markets of developed countries, which is not conducive to the improvement of the efficiency of capital allocation and the healthy development of the capital market. IPO underpricing is an adverse selection behavior caused by information asymmetry under the “commissioned-agent” relationship. The involvement of venture capital can not only reduce the degree of information asymmetry between issuers and underwriters through the “information advantage” of venture capital institutions, but also reduce the degree of information asymmetry between issuers and investors through “authentication”. In this way, the company’s IPO underpricing rate can be reduced. Joint venture capital is the collective behavior of multiple venture capital institutions, which can strengthen the “information advantage” and “certification role” of an individual venture capital institution, and can reduce the IPO underpricing rate more effectively. However, if the difference in the shareholding ratios of investment institutions in joint venture capital is too large, it will weaken the positive effect of “followers” and even the “free ride” behavior will occur, which may weaken the inhibition effect of joint venture investment on IPO underpricing rate. An analysis based on a sample of China’s GEM listed companies from 2009 to 2019 found that: venture capital intervention can significantly reduce the company’s IPO underpricing rate; the IPO underpricing rate of the companies with joint venture investment is lower than that of the companies with individual venture investment; the reduction of the difference in the shareholding ratio of various investment institutions in the joint venture capital is conducive to the reduction of the company’s IPO underpricing. In addition, companies with joint venture investment intervention have higher governance levels and return on assets than those with individual venture investment intervention, so they can reduce IPO underpricing rate more effectively. It is necessary to strengthen the supervision of the capital market, reduce the degree of information asymmetry, reduce and avoid the adverse selection behavior of underwriters and venture capital institutions. Start-up companies should choose joint venture capital as much as possible to conduct IPOs, and rationally choose venture capital institutions that are compatible with their development. Meanwhile, they should strive to improve their management level, reputation and market resource allocation ability, so as to effectively reduce IPO underpricing rate and promote high-quality development of the capital market.

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刘帷韬.联合风投比单独风投更能降低IPO抑价率吗?——来自2009—2019年中国创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].西部论坛,2021,31(5):112-124

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  • 在线发布日期: 2021-11-23