“One case, one meeting” system from bottom to above is the basic mechanism for the supply of village-level public goods now，which means that the construction projects of the village-level public need collective choices and are responsible for the construction by village cadres. “One case, one meeting” system’s early projects basically depended on villagers and the collective operations of the villagers were in predicament. After 2008, financial rewards and subsidy policy implementation made rural community public goods supply enter into a new stage with “public support but running by local people”, which effectively motivated the villagers to construct public goods via collective operations, but the financial rewards and subsidy did not directly motivate the corresponding behaviors of the village cadres. The survey and analysis based on Fujian Province show that the working enthusiasm of the village cadres is because of the effective impact of the cooperated actions between government and villagers on village cadres, among which the cadres’ behaviors are affected by their performance examination by town government and villagers meetings, meanwhile, the direct election of village head results in the working enthusiasm higher than village secretary. China should further perfect cadre performance examination mechanism and villagers democratic mechanism, continue to promote financial rewards and subsidy, and give more support to the villages with small population so as to boost the effective supply of rural community public goods.