By using the business risk as the breakthrough point, by taking 19469 yearly observation values of 2375 listed companies of China during 1999-2012 as research sample, this paper empirically tests the governance efficiency and their interaction of the supervisory board and independent directors. The research shows：（1）that the governance efficiency of the supervisory boards has been improved after introducing the independent director system, while it was weak before, which indicates that from national macro-level, the introduction of independent directors increases systematic supply of management and supervision, optimizes institutional structure and obtains the dividend brought by system competition；（2）that industrious independent directors significantly reduce the business risk, which shows that the establishment of independent directors in China’s company management structure has economic rationality；（3）and that it is a kind of substitutional relation rather than complementary relationship between independent directors and the board of supervisors, which reveals that from micro-level of a company, there is duty conflict between independent directors and board of supervisors and that under the arrangement of the initial institution of the board of supervisors, the introduction of the independent directors will weaken the supervising effect of the board of supervisors. The use of double supervision model by independent directors and the board of supervisors is difficult to solve the effectiveness of management supervision of China’s listed companies and the optimal selection for listed companies is to permit them co-existence and competition and to permit the listed companies to choose their appropriate internal supervision pattern according to their own situation.