政府层级、终极股权结构长度和宽度与股权资本成本——基于我国政府终极控股上市公司经验数据的分析
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The Length and Width of Governmental Equity and Ultimate Equity Structure and Equity Capital Cost—Analysis Based on Empirical Data of the Listed Companies with Ultimate Ownership of Chinese Government
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    摘要:

    以我国A股2004—2011年政府终极控股的上市公司作为研究样本,采用CAPM、Gordon、OJ和ES模型估算其平均股权资本成本,检验国有企业集团控股政府层级、终极股权结构长度和宽度对股权资本成本的影响,分析表明:中央政府终极控股的上市公司的股权资本成本低于地方政府终极控股的上市公司,终极股权结构长度与股权资本成本显著负相关,而终极股权结构宽度与股权资本成本不存在显著相关性。因此,相对于延长控制链条长度(控制层级),政府通过增加链条数(控制渠道)控制上市公司更加有利;政府应减少对上市公司的干预,同时也不能让终极股权结构长度无限延长。

    Abstract:

    By taking the listed companies of A-share ultimate government ownership during 2004—2011 as research objects, by using CAPM, Gordon, OJ and ES Model, their average equity capital cost is estimated, the influence of the length and width of governmental equity and ultimate ownership structure inside state-owned enterprise groups on equity capital cost is tested, and the analysis shows that the equity capital cost of the listed companies of the ultimate ownership of central government is lower than that of the listed companies of local government ownership, that there is an obviously negative correlation between ultimate ownership structure length and equity capital cost, however, there is not a significant correlation between ultimate ownership structure width and equity capital cost, thus, comparing with the extending control chain length, it is more beneficial for a government to control the listed companies via multi-channel, as a result, a government should decease its intervention with the listed companies and meanwhile should not let the ultimate ownership structure length extend limitlessly.

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王雪梅.政府层级、终极股权结构长度和宽度与股权资本成本——基于我国政府终极控股上市公司经验数据的分析[J].西部论坛,2014,24(4):87-94

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