The Limitations of Price and Advertisement to TransmitQuality Information of Medical Goods and Services—Game Analysis Based on Dual Social Security Structure
The existed research holds that price and advertisement play a key role in solving the problems in quality information asymmetry between consumers and enterprises, under the condition of dual social security structure and medical demand being much bigger than supply,however,the quality information transmission for the experience products such as medical products and service by price and advertisement is limited with the feature of that the firms with high-quality products and service use the strategy of “high price and low advertising investment” but the firms with low-quality products and service use the strategy of “low price and high advertising investment”. In terms of the groups with perfected social security,price can really play a role in transmitting medical quality signals,meanwhile,there is a possibility for medical service market to have reverse selection,as a result,the advertisements may misguide the selection of the consumers,and information asymmetry problems can not be solved. The social security system covering the whole society should be set up and perfected, the supply for excellent medical products and service should be increased,medical service supervision should be consolidated and the medical consuming quality of the consumers should be improved.