According to the data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen of electric power, coal, textile and garment industry during 20062011, the difference of CEO compensation incentive effects between monopoly industries and competitive industries of China is compared by panel estimation method, and the results show that the CEO compensation in monopoly industries in listed companies is not related to their company performance, however, the CEO compensation in competitive industries in listed companies is positively related to their company performance, that the company performance of monopoly industries is not significantly related to the ratio of the CEO shareholding, however, the ratio of the CEO shareholding in competitive industries is positively related to their company performance. Thus, the political incentive for the CEOs in state-owned enterprises of monopoly industries is higher than compensation incentive, the marketization degree of the enterprises operation is still not sufficient, and the step for stateowned enterprise system reform should be further accelerated. Besides, the research also shows that the“embezzlement”of shareholders and“internal struggle”between shareholders of the enterprises can be reduced by equity control so that the management efficiency and performance of the companies can be raised.