社会合作与利益协调:国外公共品博弈实验综述
DOI:
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

基金项目:


Social Cooperation and Interests Coordination:A Review of Foreign Public Goods Game Experiment
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
    摘要:

    在国外的经济学实验研究中,主要采用公共品博弈实验来分析社会两难中的合作问题。研究发现,公共品博弈实验中存在着不同类型的被试,其中条件合作者是最为普遍的类型;利用货币性惩罚可以维持较高的合作水平,但惩罚本身产生了二阶水平的公共品问题,货币性惩罚所隐含的效率并不明确,而反社会性惩罚可能不会增加合作并降低效率;用非货币性惩罚(如表达不满、驱逐搭便车者等)与非惩罚机制(如交流、代际忠告等)也可以维持较高的合作水平和效率。这些实验证据对我国构建和谐社会具有重要的启示作用,尤其是如何将经济实验的经验应用到“实地”环境,为解决社会两难问题进行制度设计,将是进一步研究的重要方向。

    Abstract:

    In foreign economics experiments, public goods game experiments are mainly used to analyze the cooperation issue in two social dilemmas. Research finds that there are different kinds of subjects in public goods experiments, among which conditional cooperators are most common types, the use of monetary penalty can maintain higher cooperation level, but the penalty itself produces public goods problems with the second-order level, the efficiency hidden in monetary penalty is not significant, however, social penalty may not increase cooperation but decrease efficiency, and non-monetary penalty, such as the persons expressing dissatisfaction, expelling free riders and so on, and non-penalty mechanism, such as communication, intergeneration advice and so on, can also maintain higher cooperation level and efficiency. These experiment evidences are of important enlightenment role in constructing harmonious society in China, especially how to apply the experience of economic experiments to“practical”environment to make institutional design for solving the two dilemmas, which is important direction for further study. 

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

刘建华.社会合作与利益协调:国外公共品博弈实验综述[J].西部论坛,2013,23(1):59-69

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:
  • 最后修改日期:
  • 录用日期:
  • 在线发布日期: