双边受控溢出下企业合作研发的博弈分析
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The Game Analysis of Firm Cooperative R&D under Bilateral-controlled Technology Spillover
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    技术溢出的高低受到企业间创新技术接近程度的影响,技术溢出并非仅仅是从事创新的企业单方选择的结果,而是企业双方技术路径选择组合的结果。基于“企业间的技术越兼容,技术溢出越高”的假设,将创新技术决策引入传统的双寡头博弈模型,对比分析企业创新技术选择的动机及其影响。研究结果表明:无论是合作模式还是非合作模式下,追求利润最大化的企业总会选择相同或相似的创新技术;而社会最优技术差距高于利润最大化的技术差距。因此,在技术溢出较高的行业,非合作模式可能会导致较低的社会福利,政府应当鼓励企业形成创新联盟或专利联营。

    Abstract:

    The size of technical spillover is influenced by the innovative cooperative degree between firms, and technical spillover is not only the single-part choice for the enterprise which conducts innovation but also is the result of mutual technical path choice combination of the enterprises. Based on the assumption that “the more compatible the technology between firms is, the higher the technical spillover is”, innovative technology decision is integrated into duopoly game model to comparatively analyze the motive and influence of firm innovative technology selection, and the results show that whether cooperation or non-cooperation, the enterprises which pursue profit maximization always choose identical or similar technical innovation, however, social optimal technology difference is higher than the technology difference of profit maximization, thus, in the industries which have high technical spillover, non-cooperative model may result in relatively low social welfare and so governments should encourage innovative alliance or patent-chain-business.

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孙彩虹.双边受控溢出下企业合作研发的博弈分析[J].西部论坛,2012,22(2):54-58

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