This paper concentrates on the relationship between executive pay and firm value by taking the zero dividend companies of the listed companies of China in 2007 as an example. The results of the research are as follows: The firm value has obviously negative effect on the executive pay which is only positively but slightly influenced by the current profit of a company. It is also not consistent with the motivation theory. Meanwhile, the executive pay in zero dividend companies has no obvious relationship both with the company size and the duration of zero dividends. There is no positive effect on the statistics even though the executive pay increases with the administrative expense rising, but it is significantly related with the corporate cash holdings. Overall, there is no winwin between executives and the corporate in zero dividend companies. In order to maximize personal interests, some executives may damage the company value. The saved cash flow by zero dividend policy is not completely for the profitable project investment. Finally, there are incentive incompatibilities in the compensation policy of zero dividend companies because security is too high and risk incentive is not enough for executives.