"城中村"改造中制度安排的选择
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陕西省社会科学界联合会资助项目,陕西省西安市科技局资助项目


Choice of system arrangement in the reform of "villages in cities"
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    摘要:

    "城中村"改造涉及政府、村民和开发商三者的利益冲突与协调.运用动态博弈理论分析这三个利益主体之间的关系,求得的均衡结果表明,"城中村"改造共有三种改造模式可供选择,即政府主导型、村民自治型和政府、村民、开发商共同改造型,这些模式的成功实施要遵循相应的前提条件,政府部门可以根据自己的实际情况采取最佳改造模式.

    Abstract:

    The process of the reform of "villages in cities" includes the conflicts and coordination of the interests of governments,villagers and development businessmen.Dynamic game theory is used to analyze the relationship between the three interested parties and the equilibrium results show that there are three modes which can be chosen in the reform of "villages in cities" such as governmental leading type,villagers' autonomous type and mutual reform type of government,villagers and development businessmen.The successful implementation of these modes should follow the related premise and government departments should use optimal reform mode on the basis of real situation.

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杨爽,周晓唯."城中村"改造中制度安排的选择[J].西部论坛,2006,(4):

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