区域市场"煤电联营"的博弈分析
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Game analysis of cooperation between coal enterprises and electric power enterprises
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    摘要:

    从产业结构的角度建立基于Stackelberg博弈的煤、电企业联营的收益模型,可分析不同条件下联营的效果,并对收益状况进行理论测算.研究表明,在不考虑形成联营的协调成本与稳定煤电联营的维持成本的情况下,煤、电企业实行联营,通过合理的收益分配,在用户侧电价未放开的情况下,可以保证发电企业的煤炭供应、电网的电量供给和相关利益方的收益增加.

    Abstract:

    The profit model of cooperation between coal enterprises and electric power enterprises based on Stackelberg game theory is set up from the angle of industrial structure and income prospect is calculated by using the model. The research result indicates that the cooperation coal enterprises and electric power enterprises by proper form is propitious to both sides in certain condition and the coal supply of electric power enterprises and electricity supply are guaranteed irrespective of cooperative cost of cooperation between coal enterprises and electric power enterprises.

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刘博,曾胜,靳景玉.区域市场"煤电联营"的博弈分析[J].西部论坛,2006,(2):-66,76

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