史亚东.公众环境关心、中央环保督察与地方环保支出——采用空间双重差分模型的实证分析[J].西部论坛,2022,32(1):66-82
公众环境关心、中央环保督察与地方环保支出——采用空间双重差分模型的实证分析
Public Environmental Concern, Central Environmental Protection Supervision and Local Environmental Protection Expenditure: Empirical Analysis Based on A SDID Model
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  公众环境关心  中央环保督察  地方政府环保支出  支出竞争效应  官员问责
英文关键词:public environmental concern  central environmental protection inspection  local government environmental protection expenditure  expenditure competition effect  official accountability
基金项目:
作者单位
史亚东 国际关系学院 国际经济系北京 100091 
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中文摘要:
      地方政府是环境治理的重要行为主体,其环保支出行为不仅取决于地区发展理念和发展状况,而且受到地方政府间竞争关系的影响以及上级政府和公众的监督。基于环境关键词的网络搜索评价公众环境关心程度,并以首轮中央环保督察为准自然实验,采用空间双重差分模型对2012—2018年中国30个省级区域样本的分析发现:地方政府的环保支出强度(环保财政支出占财政一般支出预算的比重)具有正向空间自相关关系,地方政府的环保支出行为存在相互模仿的竞争效应;公众环境关心具有显著的空间正相关性,公众环境关心程度的提高不仅可以促进本地环保财政支出强度的增加,而且可以促进地理位置邻近、污染排放水平和经济发展水平接近地区的环保财政支出强度提升;中央环保督察在提升地方环保财政支出强度上的政策效应不显著,但其对官员问责产生的督察压力会显著促进地方政府环保支出强度的提高。因此,在环境治理中应加强中央政府、地方政府和公众之间的协同互动关系,通过“自上而下”的上级考核与督察和“自下而上”的公众诉求与监督促进地方政府的环境治理行为改善。一方面,要重视公众的环境偏好及其社会监督作用,并利用其空间溢出效应发挥典型示范地区的辐射带动作用;另一方面,要进一步落实和完善中央环保督察制度,通过严格问责与有效激励相结合更好地促进地方政府履行环保责任。
英文摘要:
      Local governments are important actors in environmental governance, and their environmental protection expenditures not only depend on regional development concepts and development conditions, but are also affected by the competitive relationship between local governments and the supervision of higher-level governments and the public. Based on the online search of environmental keywords to evaluate the degree of public environmental concern, and taking the first round of central environmental protection inspection as the quasi-natural experiment, the spatial-difference-in-differences(SDID) model was used to analyze the samples of 30 provincial-level regions in China from 2012 to 2018. It is found that: the intensity of environmental protection expenditure of each local government (the proportion of environmental protection fiscal expenditure in the budget of general fiscal expenditure) has a positive spatial autocorrelation relationship, and the environmental protection expenditure behavior of local governments has a competitive effect of mutual imitation; the public environmental concern has a significant positive spatial correlation. The increase of the public environmental concern can not only promote the increase of the intensity of local government environmental protection expenditure, but also help the governments of neighboring regions with similar geographical location, pollution emission level and economic development level to increase the environmental protection expenditure intensity; the policy effect of central environmental supervision on improving the intensity of local government environmental protection expenditure is not significant, but the supervision pressure on the accountability of officials has a significant promoting effect on the intensity of local government environmental protection expenditure. Therefore, the coordination and interaction between central government, local government and the public should be strengthened in environmental governance, and the improvement of local government’s environmental behavior should be promoted through “top-down” superior assessment and supervision and “bottom-up” public demand and supervision. On one hand, it is necessary to pay attention to the environmental preference and social supervision of the public, and use its spatial spillover effect to play a leading role in the radiation of typical demonstration areas. On the other hand, it is necessary to further implement and improve the central environmental protection supervision system, and effectively promote the performance of local governments’ environmental protection responsibilities through the combination of strict accountability and effective incentives.
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