姚建峰,喻凡,甘家武.国有企业高管薪酬管制与委托代理问题[J].西部论坛,2020,30(5):113-124
国有企业高管薪酬管制与委托代理问题
Executive Compensation Management and Principal-agent Problem of State-owned Enterprises
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  高管薪酬  薪酬管制  第二次限薪令  委托代理问题  代理成本  在职消费  国企分类改革
英文关键词:executive compensation  compensation management  the second pay ceiling order  principal-agent problem  agency costs  duty consumption  classification reform of state-owned enterprises
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作者单位
姚建峰,喻凡,甘家武 云南财经大学 a.滇商研究院
b.国际工商学院云南 昆明 650221 
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中文摘要:
      由于国企高管的经营业绩难以被准确度量,加上监督约束机制不健全,高管的超额薪酬成为国企代理问题的一种典型表现,于是政府将高管薪酬管制作为应急措施来降低代理成本,缓解国企代理问题。采用双重差分法对2011—2018年A股上市公司的分析表明:第二次限薪令在有效限制国企高管薪酬水平的同时,没有对高管在职消费产生显著影响,有效降低了国企代理成本;但第二次限薪令也降低了薪酬激励效应,导致国企高管努力程度降低,由此造成的利益损失又成为新的代理成本。国企薪酬制度改革面临激励与管制的两难选择,应在国企分类改革的基础上对不同类型国企的高管采取不同的激励机制:对公益类及特殊行业的国企增强高管政治晋升激励,对竞争行业(营利性)国企则应在推向市场的同时放松薪酬管制,从而有效降低代理成本,解决国企代理问题。
英文摘要:
      Because the operational performance of state-owned enterprise executives is difficult to be accurately measured, and because of the unperfected supervision and constraint, the excessive compensation of the executives of state-owned enterprises becomes a typical expression of their principal-agent problem, therefore, the governments use executive compensation limit as a response measure to reduce the principal-agent cost to mitigate the principal-agent problem. The analysis by taking A-share listed companies during 2011-2018 as samples and by using the difference-in-difference method(DID)shows that the “central management enterprise salary system reform” (the second pay ceiling order) has effectively restricted the salary level of state-owned enterprise executives since it was implemented in 2015, but has not significantly effected on duty consumption, so it has reduced the agency cost in this way, however, it has also reduced the incentive effect, which leads to the reduction of the efforts of senior managers, as a result, the resulting loss of profits became a new kind of agency cost. The compensation system reform of state-owned enterprises faces two difficulties of incentive and limit, the governments should use different incentive measures for the executives of different types of the state-owned enterprises based on the classification reform of state-owned enterprises, increase political promotion for non-profit enterprises and special industrial enterprises, and use market-oriented measure and meanwhile loose the compensation limit for the state-owned enterprises in competitive industry (profitable enterprises) so as to effectively reduce principal-agent cost and to solve the principal-agent problem of the state-owned enterprises.
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