代彬,谈星辰,刘星.党组织嵌入能否遏制国企高管自利行为?——来自中国国有上市公司的经验证据[J].西部论坛,2020,30(5):97-112
党组织嵌入能否遏制国企高管自利行为?——来自中国国有上市公司的经验证据
Can the Party Organization Embedding Suppress SOEs Executives’ Self-serving Behavior?: Empirical Evidence from State-owned Listed Companies
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  党组织嵌入  高管自利行为  国有企业  审计监督  双向进入  交叉任职  超额薪酬  超额在职消费
英文关键词:the Party organization embedding  executives’ self-serving behavior  SOEs  audit supervision  two-way entry  cross appointment  excess wage  excess on the job consumption
基金项目:
作者单位
代彬,谈星辰,刘星 1.四川外国语大学 国际商学院重庆 4000312.重庆大学 经济与工商管理学院重庆 400030 
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中文摘要:
      党组织通过双向进入和交叉任职有机嵌入公司治理体系是中国国有企业的制度优势所在,也是国企治理现代化的关键要义。基于2010—2017年A股国有上市公司数据的分析表明:总体上看,党组织嵌入能够有效遏制国企高管自利行为,且嵌入程度越高治理效果越好,高质量审计可以强化党组织嵌入对高管自利行为的遏制效应。但在不同的治理情景下,不同党组织嵌入方式对不同高管自利行为的治理效果具有异质性:双向进入能够显著遏制国企高管的3种自利行为(攫取超额薪酬、拉大薪酬差距和增加超额在职消费),而交叉任职仅对国企高管攫取超额薪酬具有较好的治理效果;高质量审计可以强化党组织嵌入对国企高管谋取超额薪酬和超额在职消费的遏制作用,但未能有效强化党组织嵌入对薪酬差距扩大的治理功效;相对于中央企业和公益类国企,在地方国企和商业类国企中党组织嵌入对高管自利行为的治理效果更佳;分析师关注程度的提高和党组织新鲜血液的流入并未显著增强党组织嵌入对国企高管自利行为的遏制作用。应因企制宜有针对性地完善党组织嵌入国企治理体系的制度和机制,优化嵌入路径,加强党组织与其他治理主体的协同治理,不断提升党组织嵌入的治理效率和绩效,促进中国特色国有企业治理现代化。
英文摘要:
      The Party organization organically embedding the corporate governance system of SOEs through the two-way entry and cross appointment is the institutional advantage of China’s state-owned enterprises and is the key to the modernization of SOEs governance. The analysis based on the data of A share state-owned listed companies during 2010-2017 shows that the embedding of the Party organizations can effectively restrain the self-serving behavior of the executives, the deeper the Party organization embeds, the better the governance effect on executives’ self-serving behavior is. The high-quality audit can strengthen the restraining effect of the Party organizations on executives’ self-serving behavior. Under different governance situations, however, different embedding methods have the heterogeneity on the governance effect on different executives’ self-serving behaviors. Two-way entry can significantly suppress three kinds of self-serving behaviors of the executives such as snatching excess wage, enlarging wage gap and increasing excess on the job consumption, however, cross appointment only has good governance effect on the excess wage of the executives. High-quality audit can strengthen the suppressing effect of the Party organization embedding on snatching excess wage and excess on the job consumption but can not effectively enhance the governance effect of the embedding on enlarging the wage gap. Comparing with central enterprises and public welfare-type enterprises, the Party organization embedded into local enterprises and commercial state-owned enterprises has better governance effect on the executives’ self-serving behaviors. but with the increasing in analysts’ attention and the influx of fresh blood of the Party organization, the governance effect of the Party organizations has not been obviously enhanced. We should perfect the system and mechanism to clarify the specific situation of the Party organization embedding corporate governance, optimize the embedding path, strengthen the synergistic governance between the Party organization and other organizations, continuously improve the governance efficiency and performance and boost governance modernization for the state-owned enterprises with Chinese characteristics.
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