引用本文:
【打印本页】   【下载PDF全文】   查看/发表评论  【EndNote】   【RefMan】   【BibTex】
←前一篇|后一篇→ 过刊浏览    高级检索
本文已被:浏览 1251次   下载 823 本文二维码信息
码上扫一扫!
分享到: 微信 更多
农村社区公共品“民办公助”供给中的村干部激励研究——对福建省25县239村一事一议财政奖补实践的调研分析
李秀义1,2,刘伟平11,2
1.福建农林大学 经济学院,福建 福州 350002;2.福建江夏学院 公共事务学院,福建 福州 350108
摘要:
自下而上、自愿行动的一事一议机制是当前我国农村社区公共品供给的基本机制,该机制下社区公共项目建设需要村民进行集体选择,并由村干部负责项目建设工作。一事一议早期项目建设基本依赖“民办”,村民集体行动陷入困境;2008年后财政奖补政策的实施使农村社区公共品供给进入了“民办公助”新时期,有效调动了村民通过集体行动建设公共品的积极性,但是财政奖补没有直接对村干部的相关行为进行激励。基于福建省的调研分析表明,村干部的工作积极性之所以被调动,是由于政府与村民联合起来向村干部施加同向而有效的影响,其中乡镇通过村干部绩效考核、村民通过村民代表会议对村干部行为施加影响,同时村民直选导致村主任的工作积极性更高。应进一步完善村干部绩效考核机制和村民民主机制,继续提高财政奖补额度,并给予人口规模小的村庄更多支持,以促进农村社区公共品的有效供给。
关键词:  一事一议  农村社区公共品  民办公助  村干部  财政奖补  村民民主  干部绩效考核  村民直选  村民代表会议  村级公益事业
DOI:
分类号:
基金项目:
Research on Working Incentive of Village Cadres in“Public Support and Operation by Local People” Supply of Village-level Public Goods—Empirical Analysis of Financial Rewards and Subsidy from“One Case, One Meeting”System in Village-level Public Causes of Fujian Province
LI Xiu-yi1,2,LIU Wei-ping11,2
1.School of Economics, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fujian Fuzhou 350002, China;2. School of Public Affairs, Fujian Jiangxia College, Fujian Fuzhou 350108, China
Abstract:
“One case, one meeting” system from bottom to above is the basic mechanism for the supply of village-level public goods now,which means that the construction projects of the village-level public need collective choices and are responsible for the construction by village cadres. “One case, one meeting” system’s early projects basically depended on villagers and the collective operations of the villagers were in predicament. After 2008, financial rewards and subsidy policy implementation made rural community public goods supply enter into a new stage with “public support but running by local people”, which effectively motivated the villagers to construct public goods via collective operations, but the financial rewards and subsidy did not directly motivate the corresponding behaviors of the village cadres. The survey and analysis based on Fujian Province show that the working enthusiasm of the village cadres is because of the effective impact of the cooperated actions between government and villagers on village cadres, among which the cadres’ behaviors are affected by their performance examination by town government and villagers meetings, meanwhile, the direct election of village head results in the working enthusiasm higher than village secretary. China should further perfect cadre performance examination mechanism and villagers democratic mechanism, continue to promote financial rewards and subsidy, and give more support to the villages with small population so as to boost the effective supply of rural community public goods.
Key words:  “One case,one meeting” system  village-level public goods  public support and running by local people  village cadres  financial rewards and subsidy  villagers democracy  cadre performance examination  direct selection by villagers  villagers meeting  public cause at village-level
《西部论坛》编辑部 版权所有
地址:中国 重庆市 南岸区学府大道19号,重庆工商大学学术期刊社 邮编:400067
电话:023-62769479 传真:
您是第3170181位访客
关注微信二维码
西部论坛 在线投稿 (原《重庆工商大学学报·西部论坛》)
引用本文:
【打印本页】   【下载PDF全文】   查看/发表评论  【EndNote】   【RefMan】   【BibTex】
←前一篇|后一篇→ 过刊浏览    高级检索
本文已被:浏览次   下载  
分享到: 微信 更多
摘要:
关键词:  
DOI:
分类号:
基金项目:
Abstract:
Key words:  
《西部论坛》编辑部 版权所有
地址:中国 重庆市 南岸区学府大道19号,重庆工商大学学术期刊社 邮编:400067
电话:023-62769479 传真:
您是第3175116位访客
关注微信二维码