| 摘要: |
| 由于新古典契约受制于第三方规制，关系型契约的双方规制成为公司与农户交易关系的有效治理方式之一，而关系型契约的治理需要信任、互惠等治理手段。假设公司能够观测农户行为的结果，并通过农户行为结果来推测农户选择某种行为的动机或意图；在构建选择集比较关系的基础上，建立公司与农户互惠信任契约基本模型，分析公司和农户的最优策略，结果表明：当农户努力水平的提高能够使公司选择集中最优收益水平增加（或降低农户选择集中的最劣收益水平）时，公司的最优反应是提高总收益中农户分享的比例（比如通过提高农产品等级的方式）；如果能够预期到这一点，农户的最优策略是尽可能提高努力水平。因此，通过农户和公司之间的互惠行为，能够增强双方之间的信任程度，从而能够提高交易稳定性。 |
| 关键词: 关系型契约 双方规制 选择集比较关系 互惠信任模型 正互惠 负互惠 行为选择 农户努力水平 利他系数 |
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| Research on the Reciprocal and Trust Governance of Contract between Enterprises and Farmers |
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ZHANG Chun-xun，LU Qiang，ZHOU Jun
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| Abstract: |
| The regulation of the two parties of a relational contract becomes one of the effective governance modes because the new classical contract is restricted by the difficulties of governance of the third party while the governance of the contract needs such governance measures as reciprocity and trust and so on. We suppose that the enterprise can observe the outcome of farmer’s behavior and conjecture the motive or belief of farmer’s behavior, this paper constructs reciprocal and trust contract between leading enterprise and farmers and analyzes the optimal strategy of both parties on the basis of the construction of comparison relation between choice sets. The result shows that if the increasing of farmer’s effort leads to the increasing of optimal return in the choice set of an enterprise or the decreasing of minimum return level in choice set of rural households, the enterprise’s optimal response is to increase the proportion shared by rural households in total earnings, for example, raising the rank of agricultural products, if this point can be forecasted, the optimal strategy of agricultural households should be trying to boost effort level, thus, through reciprocal behaviors between leading enterprises and rural households, the trust degree between the two parties can be enhanced so that transaction stability can be strengthened. |
| Key words: relational contract regulation of the two parties comparison relation between choice sets reciprocal and trust model positive reciprocity negative reciprocity behavioral choice agricultural household effort level altruistic coefficient |
