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| 摘要: |
| 运用中国沪市1999--2006年的相关数据，检验会计收益的持续性对高管薪酬相对于会计业绩敏感性的影响，结果表明，高管薪酬对会计业绩的敏感性随着会计收益中所包含的持久性强度的增加而增加。这一结果支持了基于会计收益的高管薪酬合同能够激励管理者创造股东长期价值的观点。 |
| 关键词: 代理理论 会计盈余 会计收益持续性 高管薪酬 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号:F275.2 |
| 基金项目: |
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| Accounting Earnings Persistence and CEO Wages |
|
LI Su
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| Abstract: |
| In this paper,we justify that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to earnings varies with earning persistence through the data from 1999 to 2006 of Shanghai Market,China.The results show that the sensitivity of CEO wages to accounting earning increases with the increase of persistence strength in accounting earnings and support the views that CEO compensation based on earnings encourages executive to increase stockholders' wealth. |
| Key words: agency theory accounting earnings earning persistence executive wages |
