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| 摘要: |
| 新古典经济理论认为具备理性经济人性质的区域会因自利而独力研发.而博弈论的无名氏定理认为经济人的无限次重复博弈总能导致合作.本文针对这两种理论提出一个基于期权理论之上的区域间合作研发模型,该模型指出:只要存在不确定性和区间竞争压力就必定会有区域间合作研发,而区域利益最大化更是区域间合作研发的源动力. |
| 关键词: 不确定性 竞争区域 合作研发 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号:F276.42 F273.1 |
| 基金项目: |
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| Strategic selection of cooperative and independent research and development between regions under uncertainty |
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ZOU Xuan
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| Abstract: |
| New classical economics theory holds that the region which has rational economic man character will conduct research and development because of self interest. An anonymous person theorem of game theory holds that economic man's unlimited repetition game will result in cooperation. On the basis of the two theories, this paper points out a regional cooperative research and development model based on stock option theory. The model recognizes that research and development between regions will certainly happen as long as uncertainty and competition pressure exist and that optimized regional interest is the motive for cooperative research and development between regions. |
| Key words: uncertainty,competition region,cooperative research and development, |
