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| 摘要: |
| 在四种不同的市场条件下,为了实现地方社会福利最大化,地方政府进行产品质量管制的目标值不相同,社会福利水平也不相同.地方政府面临的现实条件,促使它在执行质量管制政策时,倾向于放松管制标准,纵容甚至保护"假冒伪劣"产品的生产.行政层次越低、本地产品市场占有率越低,这种现象越明显. |
| 关键词: 社会福利 质量管制 地方政府 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号:F273.2 |
| 基金项目: |
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| Target amount of quality governing by local government |
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XIONG Hong-xing SUN Cai-hong
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| Abstract: |
| Under four different market conditions, and in order to realize maximization of social welfare, the target amounts of quality governing for local government are different and corresponding social welfare is different. The realistic environment with which local governments face spurs them to lower quality standards and even to wink and shield "fake commodities". The lower the administrative is, the lower market sale rate of local products is. |
| Key words: social welfare,quality governing,local government |
