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| 摘要: |
| 本应用RCE（Rational Conjecture Equilibrium)条件来分析双头垄断企业（厂商）在成本不对称、需求不对称、产品差异化条件下对社会福利产生的不同影响，并说明了RCE条件下的双头垄断模型与cournot模型及社会最优模型的关系，提出在“结构－行为－绩效（SCP）”研究中，行为是一个重要的因素，即使在同一结构下，不同行为将会产生不同的绩效与福利。 |
| 关键词: 双头垄断 推测变差 理性推测均衡 福利 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号:F061.4 F062.6 |
| 基金项目: |
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| Welfare Analysis of Duopoly Firms Based on RCE |
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LIU Xian quan
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| Abstract: |
| This paper applies the theory of Rational Conjectural Equilibrium to analyzing Duopoly Firms' welfare and effect under the circumstances of product differentiation, demand and marginal cost asymmetry We gain three relation t heorems of Duopoly Firms with its conditional parameter, and analyze the relation between Duopoly mode with Cournot model and society optimum model, and put forward that structure is vital factor in the theory research of SCP (structure conduct performance) Even if in the same structure, different c onduct could lead to different performance and welfare |
| Key words: duopoly firms,Conjectural Variations,Rational Conjectural Equilibri um,welfare |
